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ABSTRACT 
 
 
During the East Asian Financial crisis in particular, the IMF has been criticized of 
promoting international cooperation because of the supervised enforcement of its rules. The 
purpose of this research is to find out how the IMF responded to the East Asian debt crisis and 
whether or not its responses were the best possible responses to this crisis. Through my research, 
I talked about the causes of the East Asian financial crisis, the role of the IMF in the international 
monetary system, and if the IMF responses to Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia were the best 
responses or not. After analyzing the IMF responses in this crisis, I found that the IMF policies need to 
be reformed in order to monitor and prevent future financial crises spill-over effects at the global and 
regional levels. I will analyzed 5 scholarly journals on the financial crisis in East Asia, 3 scholarly 
articles on the role of IMF in the East Asia financial crisis, and 1 novel called POLITICS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA DEMOCRACY OR LESS by William Case. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Several financial crises have occurred in the world economy through the last decades. 
Some examples include the East Asian financial Crisis of 1997, the Latin American debt crisis of 
1994-95, the Russian crisis of 1998, and the Brazilian crisis of 1998-99 which spread out to other 
areas also known as the “contagion effect”. During these crises, the International Monetary 
Funds (IMF) has been involved and known as a crisis manager. The IMF was created in 1945 
after World War 2. The IMF is charged with overseeing the system of exchange rates and 
international payments that enables countries of the world and their citizens to buy goods and 
services from each other. The IMF played an important role in ensuring exchange rate stability, 
encouraging  its  member  countries  to  eliminate  exchange  restrictions  that  hindered  trade, 
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operating a system of fixed exchange in which all member countries’ currencies are pegged to 
the dollar, and by acting as a lender of last resort when a member country faced an economic 
crisis. But, the institution (IMF) raison d’etre collapsed after 1971 when the major currencies 
moved to a floating exchange rate system. Despite the IMF success in accomplishing its job in 
other crises, the IMF has been seriously criticized during the East Asian financial crisis of 
promoting international cooperation because of the supervised enforcement of its rules. The 
advent of the East Asian debt crisis marked a major turning point for the IMF’s fortunes. Based 
on this thought, this paper proposes a detailed analysis of the causes of the East Asian financial 
crisis, and the role of the IMF during the financial crisis. Finally, this research paper will answer 
the question whether or not the IMF fulfilled its mission during the East Asian crisis and if the 
IMF responses were the best responses possible. 
 
 
 
LITTERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Since 1990 there was a rapid buildup of short term external debt in the weak Asian 
financial market. Domestic banks were borrowing at a high rate, mostly in US dollars. Even 
though in a booming economy this does not pose a problem, the situation in the Asian economy 
was very different. The weaknesses of the Asian financial system were at the root of the East 
Asian financial crisis. The economies of Asian countries were performing well up until they 
experienced a huge and rapid capital inflow of foreign financial investments which exposed them 
to a financial crisis. Despite such success theories, Khan, Islam and Ahmed (2005) pointed out 
that, economists predicted that these economies will run into a phase of declining growth or 
diminishing productivity. The financial crisis has been seen by many other economists as one 
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event which started in the middle of 1997 and had a continued effect until the end of 
1998.nTherefore, economists depicted the crisis in two different stages. The first stage of the 
panic started in July 1997 and affected the “East Asian Tigers”: Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Singapore. The second stage of the crisis started in October, 1997 affecting Indonesia, Hong 
Kong, Japan. This second stage of the crisis also affected the world’s 11th largest economy, 
South Korea, and brought down their economy in December of 1997. The crisis was triggered 
first by Thailand’s large current account deficit and second by Japanese banks which are the 
largest lenders in Asia and one of Asia’s main creditors. The real seeds of the financial crisis, 
however, were sown during the early 1990s in the aftermath of the real estate1 and stock market2 
bubble which severely damaged the balance sheets of Japanese commercial banks. When the 
crisis hit South Korea and Thailand, the Japanese commercial banks withdrew quickly their loans 
from Thai banks in 1997 and reduced their exposure in other Asian countries due to their need to 
avoid losses and to protect their capital base. (King, 2001, p.439) argued that, “Japanese banks 
had been severely weakened by the collapse of the real estate and stock market bubble in Japan 
in 1990. As the largest lenders in Asia, Japanese banks signaled the change in sentiment to other 
foreign commercial banks who also withdrew their loans. These capital outflows triggered 
currency devaluation in Thailand in mid-1997, but not in Korea until late 1997, due to the 
different exchange rate regimes in these countries”. This financial crisis had a huge impact on the 
world global economy causing stock markets to fall in the United States, Europe, Brazil and 
Russia and all over the world. 
 
 
 
 
1 Real estate bubble is a  run-up in housing prices or values fueled by market demand and speculation 
 
2 Stock market bubble is when speculators and investors are pushing the overall value of a market beyond 
its proper or normal value 
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The earliest stages of the East Asian financial crisis started with the “Asian economic 
miracle”. The Asian economic miracle is defined as the attraction of huge foreign capital into 
Asian countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines and South Korea) which 
maintained a high rate of return due to their remarkable rate of economic growth and progress. 
During the Asian economic miracle, non-state actors (institutional investors, foreign banks) in 
particular, gained control over the East Asian states capital flow and started making huge 
investment decisions that full the Asian economy. King (2001) said that institutional investors 
were professional firms which direct flows of investment and credit on behalf of savers. This 
category included commercial banks, portfolio investors in equity and debts, and foreign direct 
investment by national multinational enterprises. But by 1990, the “Asian Tigers” (Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea) were struggling with collapsing currencies, 
banks failure, and plunging stocks and assets markets. 
However, the root and depth of the Asian financial crisis can be explained through a 
theory called, the ‘moral hazard’3 theory. According to this theory, the supply of bank credits to 
borrowers exceeded by far the existent investment opportunities without government guarantee. 
Khan et al. (2005) argued that financial intermediaries such as banks, stock exchange, insurance 
companies had excessive risky lending practices which sent the asset prices skyrocketing and 
had a false impression of having the government guarantee. Bank credit to the East Asian Tigers 
expanded rapidly from 1991 to 1996 at a rate of 10-30 percent per year. International bank loans 
to the Asian Tigers doubled from $121 billion to $261 billion. In South Korea and Indonesia for 
example, government urged banks to lend money to politically-connected businesses and large 
 
 
3 Moral hazard refers to a situation where economic actors such as business investors, foreign firms make 
profit-maximizing but inefficient investments decisions because they are able to avoid costs associated 
with their conducts. 
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infrastructure projects. So when the bubble4 burst, a financial crisis was set in motion and went 
out of hands. After researching, economists found that two types of moral hazard were at work 
during the crisis: the Domestic moral hazard and the International moral hazard. Domestically, 
banks were encouraged to borrow short term loans from abroad which were invested in risky 
domestic ventures under the belief that these investments carried government guarantees. 
Internationally, foreign borrowers lend to Asian borrowers at an increase risks with the 
assumptions that they will be protected by an international bail-out in case there is financial 
crisis. Unfortunately, that was not the case when the crisis exploded. Based on the moral hazard 
theory, investors thought that they have made wise investments decisions by investing in Asian 
countries without even accessing the externalities5 created by these investments. So when the 
financial crisis hit Asia, investors were the one who beard most the costs of the moral hazard 
because the borrowers could not afford to pay back their credits. In addition to that, the 
borrowers did not have any government guarantees that will ensure a bail-out in case of a 
financial collapse. As a result both investors and borrowers could not avoid the consequences of 
the crisis. 
Despite the moral hazard theory, crony-capitalism6 was a cause of the East Asian 
financial crisis. Crony-capitalism was highly emphasized in Indonesian and South Korea. The 
corrupt relationship between the conglomerates and financial institutions under Suharto’s rule 
contributed to the spread of the Economic crisis in Indonesia. Khan et al. (2005) mentioned that, 
these corrupt relationships between the conglomerates and financial institutions sow the seeds of 
 
 
4 A bubble is an economic cycle characterized by rapid expansion followed by a contraction. 
5 Externalities are positive or negative consequences of an economic activity that are experienced by 
unrelated third parties. 
6 Crony capitalism is a term used to describe a capitalist society based on the close relationships between 
businessmen and the state 
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the trouble and showed symptoms of “crony capitalism”. So in an atmosphere of tied and 
specific relationship between government and favorite companies, efficient market neither 
flourished nor developed. 
The East Asian Financial crisis broke out on July 2nd 1997 when Thailand devaluated the 
baht by abandoning its exchange rate peg with the US dollar due to other foreign speculators and 
institutional investors. Since 1990, Thailand’s current account deficit (the sum of the country’s 
trade deficit and the interest on its foreign obligation) exceeded four percent of Thailand’s GDP, 
implying that Thailand had to attract more foreign capital each year to stop the account deficit 
decline. Unfortunately, Thailand’s account deficit ended up in a steady decline when foreign and 
local investors became aware that the borrowers would be incapable to pay their debts and 
therefore pulled out their investments. Even though Thailand’s large current account deficit 
persisted since the 1990s, investors still believed that Thailand might be different because much 
of its capital inflow came as a direct investment instead of an indirect investment by Japanese 
manufacturing firms and banks. Investors also derived confidence in Thailand’s high savings rate 
and large government budget surplus. 
But, the primary reason that kept foreign investments coming to Thailand and local funds 
staying was the combination of high interest rates on Thai Baht deposits and a promise by the 
government that the baht’s value would remain fixed at 25 baht/1 dollar. Unfortunately, the 
baht’s fixed value could not be sustained any longer because the Japanese yen declined by 35 
percent relative to the dollar. And since Japan was the major trading partner of Thailand, the rise 
in the value of the dollar implied the rise in the value of the baht which made Thai products more 
expensive and less competitive in the international market. This situation led foreign speculators 
to sell the Baths. According to Feldstein (1998), the Thai government secretly bought the baht to 
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support its value but eventually had to give up because they couldn’t keep the promise of 
sustaining the baht. In 1996, the Thai stock market and the real estate market both declined. In 
order to assist distressed Thai finance institutions burdened by bad property loans, the 
government injected money into the Thai economy, imposed capital controls and forced their 
minister of finance to resign after failing to save Finance One, the largest Thai finance company. 
King (2001) argued that the finance minister paid a visit to the central bank and discovered that 
almost all of the country's $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves had been committed in 
forward contracts, while another $8 billion had been used by the central bank's Financial 
Institutions Development Fund to prop up struggling finance companies. Therefore, the finance 
minister did not have any choice but to renege on the government's promise to re-capitalize 
Finance One with public money, by allowing it to fail. Foreign and domestic investors as well as 
commercial banks saw this action as a betrayal of the government’s promise that their 
investments would be safe and protected. The devaluation of the baht and the broken promises of 
the government over Finance One enabled foreign institutional investors to recheck the risks of 
investments in that particular region of Asia. 
As a consequence to the Thai finance collapse, the dominoes began to fall. Japanese 
brokers such as Sanyo Securities and their largest security firms such as Yamaichi Securities and 
Hokkaido Takushoku bank filed bankruptcy. On the other hand, the crisis started expanding in 
Asia due to poor domestic conditions which forced Japanese banks to look for more profitable 
investments abroad. Japanese banks funded overseas loans and expanded their loans to Japanese 
manufacturers who moved their production facilities abroad in order to remain competitive in the 
international market and raise the value of the yen. Japanese banks were also the most powerful 
and largest suppliers of bank credit in Asia with $275 billion of loans. This strong financial 
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position gave Japanese banks a key position in the market making them the key marginal lender. 
Being the marginal lender in the Asian market, Japanese banks reconsidered the risks of lending 
with the trouble that emerged in Thailand and at home. As a result, they could not afford to lose 
money and therefore stopped extending loans to Thailand and started withdrawing money from 
other Asian countries. Other foreign banks responded in the same fashion by withdrawing huge 
amounts of money from the Asian 5 which had a huge impact on the Asian economy. “By June 
1998, commercial loans outstanding to the Asian-5 had declined to $210 billion, an outflow over 
12 months of $65 billion or 7 percent of pre-shock GDP. Thailand lost $23 billion or 33 percent 
of its foreign loans; Indonesia lost $8 billion or 14 percent and Malaysia lost $6 billion or 20 
percent” (King, 2001, p. 449). Japanese companies were then forced to reduce their exposure in 
the Asia financial market due to the failing banking system, the decline of their equity and a 
rising number of bankruptcies within their economy which permitted the crisis to spill over to 
other Asian countries. 
The spreading or the “contagion effect” of the crisis to Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Philippines was also based on the fact that investors began to be worried about these countries 
large account deficits, the increase ratio of their foreign debt to local GDP, and the decline of 
their trade competitiveness. The Thai Baht collapse forced the peso in the Philippines to float, 
while Malaysia allowed its national currency the ringgit to downgrade. Due to this situation, 
Singapore let its currency depreciate forcing its neighboring country Indonesia to depreciate the 
rupiah on 14th August 1997. However, trade linkages among these countries tied their economies 
 
together which enabled the transmission of the crisis from one country to another. Also, 
economic changes are more likely to happen in a region if the countries of that region share the 
same macroeconomic policies, have similar financial institutions, and are connected to each 
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other through a pattern of mutual trade and investment. The weaknesses of the Indonesian 
economy that made it vulnerable to an attack on its currency were similar to Thailand’s economy 
weaknesses. These weaknesses were: rising external liabilities, private sector debt, poor loan 
quality, lack in the government’s ability to solve problems, excessive amounts of foreign 
investment, and overvalued currency pegged to the US dollar. According to Khan et al. (2005) 
“A nominal devaluation in the currency of one of the countries may put its trading partners, who 
are exporting similar goods to a common market, at a corn petitive disadvantage. For example, 
with the devaluation of the Baht, exports from its regional partners were at a 
disadvantage”(p.173). Although the Indonesian government attempted to stabilize the situation 
by defending the currency, using the Central Bank reserves, the situation continued to deteriorate 
due to the link between these economies. Nicola, Bello, and Mallhotra (1998) said that even though 
the Central Bank attempted to rescue the currency by raising interest rates; the rupiah hit the 
lowest value of 2682 rupiah/1 dollar, from a level of 2400 rupiah/1 dollar. Each market was then 
forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy and let the international market determine and 
fix their currency value. An analysis of trade flow among these countries is central to exploring 
the role of trade links in the spreading of the crisis 
It is noteworthy that the Indonesian economy was embedded in a nepotistic system of 
money lending and deal making. Big project contracts were awarded to President Suharto’s 
offspring and therefore benefited only the people of his family and not the population at large. 
According to Nicola Bullard et al. (1998), “Estimates of the family fortune vary wildly, from $6 
billion to $40 billion, making it one’s of the world’s largest family fortunes. Foreign companies 
hoping to do businesses in Indonesia often hire Suharto section scions as consultants to grease 
the wheels”(p. 515). The only exit option for Thailand and Indonesia was to contract their 
10
Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, Vol. 13 [2013], Art. 9
http://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol13/iss1/9
  
 
current account deficit by increasing exports and reducing imports which required a reduction in 
public and private consumption and investments. They also found out that they needed to shrink 
their current account deficit by increasing exports and reducing imports. As the last resort, 
Indonesia and Thailand decided to refer to the traditional IMF cure tailored to each country. This 
particular cure is the combination of reduced government spending, imposed higher taxes, and 
tighter credit. 
Unlike the other Asian countries, the Korean situation was much different. Three main 
factors appeared to be the causes of the crisis in South Korea. Bullard et al. (1998) argued that, 
the first factor was the government failure to invest significantly in research and development, 
the second was the massive trade blitz unleashed on South Korea by the US and the third was 
Korean membership to the OECD, which forced the country to adopt a more liberal stance 
towards foreign capital and finance. These were the factors that exposed the Korean government 
incapacity to prevent market failure which had been the main driving force of the country’s 
economic success during the ‘miracle decades’7. The Korean high-speed industrialization 
framework during the miracle decades was a strategic relationship between the private sector and 
the government. The government was picking specific industries which provided them with 
subsidized credit through a government directed banking system and protected them from 
international competition. The state nurtured industrial conglomerates called ‘Chaebols’8 such as 
Samsung, Hyundai, LG that it pushed out into the international market. This strategy was really 
successful in the 1970s and became the foundation of South Korea industrialization and export 
growth. In the early 1990s, the tide turned against South and everything fell apart. Instead of 
 
 
7 Miracle decades is a term used in reference to the highly developed economy growth of Singapore, 
Hong Kong, South Korean and Taiwan from 1960 to 1990 
8 Chaebols: big industrial conglomerates created by the state 
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pouring money into R&D to turn out high-value added commodities and develop more 
sophisticated production technologies, South Korea’s conglomerates went for the quick and easy 
route to profits which is buying up real estate or pouring money into stock market speculation, 
Bullard et al. (1998). 
In addition, South Korea for a long time, kept its status of labor-intensive assembly point 
for Japanese inputs using Japanese technology. Most of the machines in industrial plants were 
imported from Japan. As a result, South Korea had a trade deficit with Japan and later, the US 
which was estimated to $21 billion. Furthermore, competition with other East Asian countries 
with cheaper labor put high pressure on South Korea. Bullard et al. (1998) found that all of these 
elements, combined with over-expansion and over-specialization, meant that by 1996 the top 20 
listed companies in South Korea were earning a mere 3% on assets, while the average costs of 
borrowing had risen to 8.2%. In a breakneck attempt to regain trust and profitability, the 
parliamentary government tried to enact a series of laws that will enable them to fire labor and 
reduce the workforce, similarly like the US style of cutting off extra labor and making the 
remaining workforce more productive. Unfortunately, the government decision was ineffective. 
The Korean banking became unable to neutralize the impact of foreign capital flows by directing 
the funds into safe lending which created an excess of liquidity that spilled over into risky and 
speculative investments. By October 1997, it was estimated that non-performing loans by South 
Korean enterprises and banking institutions had escalated to over $50 billion. By November 
1997, South Korea decided to join Thailand and Indonesia in the queue for an IMF bail-out. 
The IMF’s role in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea went far beyond its role defined 
in the Article of Agreement. The consequences of the IMF’s experiences in earlier crises were 
proved  in  its  unfolding  role in  the  East  Asian  debt  crisis.  As  before,  the  IMF  has  nicely 
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emphasized the internal roots of the problem but has deflected its attention from its earlier 
endorsement of these countries policies when they were growing. For example, the IMF was 
praising the Thai authorities in the late 1996 for their consistent and robust record of 
macroeconomic management policies. The IMF went further and promoted Thailand as a model 
of development for the rest of the Third world due to its high growth rate and its openness to 
foreign capital flows. These were the signs that fool the IMF and that was the reason why the 
IMF failed to predict the East Asian financial debt crisis. Kapur (1998) argued that, the IMF and 
the international market claimed that they were shocked to find that the East Asian regime 
impressive economic achievements were built on such unsafe foundations. Faced with the 
pressing rescue alarm from Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, the IMF decided to provide 
credit or offer a bail-out package to these countries instead of relying on private banks loans. In 
exchange, the IMF imposed a program requiring the Thai, Indonesian, and Korean governments 
to reform their financial institutions and to make changes in their economic and political 
structures. Based on this statement, Feldstein (1998) said that “The conditions imposed on 
Thailand and Indonesia were more like the comprehensive reforms imposed on Russia, including 
the recent emphasis on reducing Russian corruption, than like the macroeconomic changes that 
were required in Latin America” (p.24). 
In Thailand, the government negotiated an agreement with the IMF on 20th  of August 
 
1997. In exchange for a $16.7 billion package, later raised to $17.2 billion, the Thai authorities 
agreed to stabilization and structural adjustment programs with two principal component 
proposed by the IMF. First, the stabilization program would cut the current account deficit 
through the maintenance of high interest rates; increase the rate of the value-added tax (VAT) to 
10 percent in order to achieve a small surplus in the public sector by 1998; cut government 
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expenditure in numerous areas; and cut subsidies on some utilities and petroleum products. The 
second part was the structural reform program of the financial sector. This program divided, 
suspended, and restructured unviable institutions, took immediate steps to instill confidence in 
the rest of the financial system, and imposed strict conditionality on the extension of the 
Financial Institutions Development Fund resources in order to restore a healthy financial sector. 
At the heart of the structural reform, the IMF stressed on the closing down of 42 finance 
companies considered as unviable institutions. This agreement also stated that the $17 billion 
will be solely devoted to finance the balance of payment deficit and rebuild the official reserve of 
the Thai bank. In other words, this sum cannot be used to bail-out local institutions. Part of this 
program required the remaining financial institutions to strengthen their capital base which 
included a policy that encouraged foreign capital injection. 
On October 1997, the Thai government finally came up with details of the stabilization 
program which underlined their commitment to generate a budget surplus equivalent of 1% of 
gross domestic product by imposing a series of taxes. These series of taxes included increases on 
duties on luxury imports, surcharges on imports not used by the export sector, and a gas tax of 
one baht per liter on fuel. On the government side, spending was cut by 100 billion baht bringing 
it down to 800 billion baht. On the financial sector reform side, the authorities came up with the 
creation of the Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA) to oversee the rehabilitation plans 
submitted by the companies that were suspended and closed. The FRA role was to determine 
whether or not these companies would be allowed to reopen or remain closed. The government 
established also an Asset Management Corporation (AMC) to oversee the disposal of the assets 
of the finance companies ordered to be closed. The government promised foreign investors to 
own  up  to  100  percent  of  financial  institutions,  tighten  rules  and  provide  full  government 
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guarantees for depositors and creditors, and improve bankruptcy laws to allow creditors to 
collect their collateral faster. On December 7th, 1997 the Chuan government announced after the 
review of the FRA and AMC that all but two of the 58 finance companies would be closed. 
Finally, the IMF money was released. The Chuan government allowed foreign investors to own a 
big stake in Thai corporations and foreign banks began again to work out deals with Thai banks. 
Nicola Bullard et al. (1998) said that “The Japanese Sanwa Bank announced that it would take a 
10% stake in one of the country’s biggest banks, Siam Commercial Bank, a move that would 
bring total foreign shareholding in that bank to 35%. Citibank declared that it would move to 
gain a 50.1% ownership share in First Bangkok City Bank”(p.512). After the implementation of 
all programs required by the IMF, the IMF’s Asia pacific director Herbert Neiss in  1998 
admitted that the Thai economy slowed down instead of getting back on track. 
In South Korea, the IMF did not wait to respond to their call for assistance. In just one 
week after the call, The IMF mission came up with a rescue package of $57 billion. Prakash 
(2001) explained that these stand-by credits are comprised $21 billion from the IMF, $10 billion 
from the World Bank, $4 billion from the Asian Development Bank and a total of $20 billion 
from leading industrial countries, including $10 billion from Japan and $5 billion from the US. 
Even with this rescue package, after a week, stock market and currency continued to fall. The 
IMF had to come up with a new kind of loan due to the country’s advanced economic state and 
tough negotiators. As a result, the IMF came up with a new deal that ensured that South Korea 
would avoid default on the $66 billion of the total $120 billion short term foreign debt. The other 
lenders (Japan, Germany, and USA) were relieved by the IMF condition imposed on South 
Korea because they too were not ready to accept a default given the state of their banking 
systems. The IMF invented a new kind of loan, the ‘Supplemental Reserve Facility’ to enable it 
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to bypass its normal ruling that financial packages are not allowed to exceed five times the 
recipient country’s IMF quota, Bullard et al. (1998). 
Like all IMF bail-out agreements, the details of this new deal highlighted the tightening 
of fiscal and monetary policies, combined with the reform of the labor market, the opening of 
Korean financial sector to US banks and fund managers, the raise of interest rates from 12.5% to 
21%, the control of money supply to contain inflation, the increase of the value added tax 
(VAT), and the opening of product markets to Japanese goods. In addition, the agreement 
included the establishment of an independent central bank which weakened the relation between 
the government and the chaebols. One of the outline objectives of the IMF was to destroy the 
chaebols which was the foundation of South Korea fabulous economic growth and increasing 
global presence. The closing of the chaebols created massive workers lay-off and a declining 
productivity which resulted in an anti-government backlash. Bullard et al. mentioned that the 
South Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) said that it is the workers, not 
government officials or leaders that are responsible for the economic crisis and who will have to 
bear the blame of any IMF measures. The agreement also included the closing of bankrupted 
financial institutions and allowed foreign banks to establish subsidiaries. Other key reforms were 
the approval of foreign entry into the domestic financial sector; trade liberalization, the review of 
corporate governance and structure and the capital account liberalization. Just after the Korean 
government agreed on these terms, the first installment of cash was offered by the IMF and the 
US to the Korean government. Following few weeks after the agreement, the Korean 
government realized that the IMF rescue program will not solve the financial problem because 
the government was unable to meet its short term debt obligation. Conway and Fischer (2006) 
argued that Jeffrey D Sachs accused the IMF of secrecy and noted that, the IMF insisted that all 
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candidates had to immediately endorse an agreement they had no part in drafting which meant 
they had no time to understand and had no clue on whatsoever they were doing. 
Unlike Thailand and South Korea, Indonesia has been reluctant to accept the IMF short 
term rescue package. Case (2002) mentioned that “Many elites and members of the middle class 
were offended by their country’s evident loss of sovereignty, indeed, the haughtiness with which 
conditions seemed to be imposed” (p.54). Despite this reluctance, Suharto’s government 
accepted a rescue package of $23 billion from the IMF after agreeing on the loan terms (tight 
fiscal and monetary policies, closing of bankrupt financial institutions, liberalizing foreign trade 
and investment, reduce export taxes, open more sectors of the economy to foreign investment, 
and privatize public enterprises). The IMF bail-out package did little in slowing the falling of the 
rupiah and the flow of money out of the country. Bullard et al. (1998) found that the Indonesian 
market needed more than the IMF’s intervention to convince it that all was well in the state of 
Suharto. Faced with massive unemployment and a rapidly contracting economy, Suharto 
proposed a budget as a response to these circumstances. His budget stressed on the increase in 
subsidies for petrol, rice, fertilizer, an increase in government spending but did not mention 
when and how these subsidies would be abolished. As a result, both the IMF and the 
international market disagreed on his budget and decided to send money outside the country and 
sell off the currency which hit 17000 rupiah/dollar. The IMF responded to this situation by 
proposing a second agreement to Indonesia. In contrast to the first agreement which was set with 
macroeconomic objectives, this agreement specified microeconomic objectives. Prakash (2001) 
said that what the new deal lacks in macroeconomic targets is made up for in microeconomic 
directives which strike at the very heart of Suharto’s economic power, addressing in detail the 
dismantling of cartels, monopolies and taxes which directly benefit Suharto.  The IMF demanded 
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liberalization of trade in agricultural products such as cloves, oranges, and vanilla. On January 
2007, the government announced a temporary freeze on debt servicing by Indonesian companies 
along with a plan of closing down non-viable banks and sell their assets. Meanwhile, as a result 
of this second agreement, the Indonesian economy was burdened with a huge foreign debt 
estimated at $140 billion in total, due to the IMF conditions and the collapse of the rupiah which 
unfortunately doubled the price of imported goods and food prices. “What was really needed, 
they suggested, was the rescheduling of business short-term loan obligations in order that it 
could restart production”(Case, 2002, p.54). 
Again, Suharto in a desperate effort to attract foreign investors established the currency 
board which put him in conflict with the IMF. According to Bullard et al. (1998), the reasons 
that motivated Suharto to set up the currency board were those. First it allowed him and his 
people to wipe off their foreign debts at 5500 Rupiah rather than 10000 Rupiah. Second, it gave 
Suharto some breathing space to reassert his control over the economic policy after the 
humiliating acquiescence to the IMF earlier in the year. Finally, the currency board would have 
the effect of bringing back foreign exchange into the country from investors that are ready to 
reinvest as soon as the rupiah regained its market value. Unfortunately, the IMF disagreed on the 
currency board proposed by Suharto. Case (2002) argued that, even though the IMF had 
endorsed the currency boards in other crises, it demonstrated that it was inappropriate in 
Indonesia because of the country’s poor banking system and diminished foreign exchange 
reserve. During that time, Suharto reconsidered his idea of instituting the currency board because 
he did not want to break the IMF conditions. From the Indonesian case, there was clearly a 
power struggle between the IMF and Suharto over the settlement of the crisis. However, 
Suharto’s interest in protecting the Indonesian economy were the same as the IMF interest in 
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rebuilding the economy. The only difference between the two was the way each of them wanted 
to settle the crisis. 
Following the IMF intervention in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, it is worth 
calling into question the efficacy and appropriateness of the IMF’s economic advice, as well as 
the way it operated in resolving the financial crisis. In analyzing the course of its actions in these 
countries, we can say that the IMF gave poor advice on how to resolve a private sector financial 
crisis such as: encourage lenders and others to lend more money during crises, promise creditors 
that they will not lose money, the combination of budget deficit reduction9 and tighter monetary 
policy10 which raise unemployment and bring down growth, and poor macroeconomic policies. 
In addition, the IMF acted in much the same it did during the Latin-American and the Russian 
crises even though the situation in the Asian countries was very different. Instead of urging the 
dissolution of capital controls, the IMF began calling for properly sequenced liberalization of 
government controls on money flows in and out of these countries. The public sector reforms 
(budget cuts, raise in taxes) imposed by the IMF were inappropriate for the circumstances of a 
private debt crisis. The public sector reforms in fact contracted the economies instead of bringing 
them under control. In Indonesia for example, detailed conditions related to the banking sector 
were imposed despite the fund limited expertise in this particular area. Although the IMF argued 
that these reforms were necessary to control inflation and stabilize currencies, the reforms that 
were implemented in Indonesia for example clearly accelerated the political and economic 
tailspin. Bullard et al. (1998) mentioned that, the currency crisis is not the result of Asian 
government profligacy. This was a crisis mate mainly in the private, albeit under-regulated, 
financial markets. 
 
 
9 budget deficit reduction: raise taxes and cut government spending 
10 tighter monetary policy: high interest rates and less credit availibity 
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I think the IMF applied measures that were designed to control and command 
government spending instead of focusing on the real issue which was the revival of private- 
sector. In Thailand and South Korea for example, currencies continued to devalue even after the 
IMF interventions which simply means that their economic policies were not tackling the real 
problem. The continued expansion of the IMF’s power and mandate is bad for debtor nations and 
for the global financial system because the increasing scope of loan conditions means that during 
financial crisis, the IMF will take over a country’s decision-making process without any 
accountability of the country’s government which can be considered as the violation of the 
country’s sovereignty. Further, the IMF did not have a perfect solution to the “moral hazard” 
problem that created the crisis. In order to solve this problem, both the borrowers and creditors 
should be punished for their unwise investments decisions, but as we have noticed in the Asian 
financial crisis only the borrowers were punished and not the creditors. And that is the main 
reason why many economists accused the IMF of perpetuating the problem. According to Wang 
(2001), the IMF was accused of creating the problem of moral hazard, because both creditors and 
debtors who make unwise investment choices are saved from the consequences of their bad 
decisions, thus making it more likely that they will reoffend in the future. In Thailand for 
example, part of the structural adjustments program required financial institutions to strengthen 
their capital base which included a policy that encouraged more foreign capital injection. 
Another part of the rescue package was devoted to service the country’s foreign debt incurred by 
international private banks. So, we can say that the IMF applied tight fiscal and monetary 
policies which were unequally distributed between domestic and foreign interests. In Thailand 
and Indonesia for example, domestic firms were left at the mercy of the international market. 
The IMF asserted that the bankrupted firms could not be bailed-out but rather closed instead. In 
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South Korea, the IMF imposed the closure of chaebols (Hyundai, Samsung) which spearheaded 
South Korea’s growth. Feldstein (1998) said that the tight fiscal and monetary requirements 
deepened the crisis by squeezing domestic credit and pushing up interest rates which together 
depressed growth and raised unemployment. On other words, the IMF permitted foreign 
investors the rights to ownership by liberalizing the financial sector and opening more the 
economic sector to foreign investors. 
It is also important to note that the role of the IMF is to develop a rescue program for a 
country in need and not initiate these programs by enforcing economic structural changes and the 
notion of institutions. But following the IMF operations in this crisis, it has exceeded its mandate 
as defined in the Articles of Agreement and played the role of economic policeman. Feldstein 
(1998) said that “the Fund should not use the opportunity of countries being down and out to 
override national political processes or impose economic changes that however helpful they may 
be, are not necessary to deal with the balance-of-payments problem and are the proper 
responsibility of the country’s own political system” (p.28). In other words, nothing about trade 
and investment liberalization, privatization, and public sector austerity were mentioned in the 
objectives of the institution but have become central when dealing with the Asian financial crisis. 
Additionally, the IMF surveillance should not only point to domestic vulnerabilities, but should 
also focus on the spillover effects of risks at regional and global levels. 
However, the objectives that were mentioned regarding the IMF role of promoting high 
levels of employment and real income and the development of productive resources of all 
members, we can conclude were failed to be achieved in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. 
In contrary the IMF initiatives raise unemployment and the poverty rates. I think the IMF should 
act as a good monitor to emerging countries by providing its own funds as an indication of its 
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support to these emerging countries rather than as a bailout of international lenders in time of 
crises. The IMF should also work with emerging countries that have not reached a financial crisis 
yet in order to bring them under control by providing good, accurate, and sustainable solutions to 
“regional or homegrown crises”. The IMF have to put in place a mechanism to monitor, regulate 
and control international financial flow in order to prevent further crises. A concise system 
should be established by the IMF for the effective resolution of private sector debt crises based 
on clear rules and bankruptcy procedures. This system will give full responsibility to countries to 
assume full responsibility for unrecoverable private sector debts. Feldstein (1998) argued that, 
the IMF should work with countries that have not yet reached a currency crisis in order to 
prevent the large current account deficits or the excess short-term debts that could later 
precipitate and quicken a financial crisis. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The IMF responses to the East Asian financial crisis were not the best possible responses. 
It appears that the IMF has failed in its mission of helping countries in financial distress. Its role 
went far beyond what it was supposed to be (lend to countries with balance of payments 
difficulties, keep track of the global economy and economies of member countries). The crisis 
tested the effectiveness and relevance of the International Monetary Fund responses and we can 
say that the IMF policies overall accelerated economic contraction, did not stabilize currencies as 
wished and did not restore market confidence. The crisis also demonstrates that the IMF 
surveillance framework should be adapted to include economic, political, and social changes that 
take place around regions because governments are no longer the main borrowers, private 
capitals ventures are more dominant. I personally think that the IMF should go back to its 
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original role which is a supportive organization that helps countries in financial distress rather 
than changing their political structures and imposing economic reforms. I also think that the IMF 
needs to improve their framework for assessing financial market stabilities and reinforce early 
warning capabilities in emerging markets countries11  (EMC). The global effect of the crisis 
recalls the IMF role to improve the monitoring of cross country spill-over effects12. The IMF 
 
should also provide technical assistance on how the debtors can improve their current account 
balance. Feldstein (1998) noted that in deciding whether to insist on a reform, the IMF should 
ask two questions: Is this reform really needed to restore the country’s access to international 
capital market? Is this a technical matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the proper 
jurisdiction of a sovereign government? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Emerging market economies are financial markets that are in the transitional phase from developing 
countries to developed ones 
12 Spill-over effects are positive or negative externalities of economic processes that affect those who are 
not directly involved 
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